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PLEADING
THOMAS M. STUBBS*
There were no statutory changes in the subject of Pleading
in 1954. But few cases in that field have been decided by the
Supreme Court during the last twelve months, most of which
were of the usual or routine type, only a few of them being
in any sense unique or involving the decision of points of first
impression.
Process and Service
In Corley v. Wells1 the question was raised whether or not
the county court erred in sustaining a ruling of the master in
equity ordering that judgment be vacated and defendant
be allowed time to answer in circumstances when the trial
court refused to permit plaintiff to supplement affidavit of
service of process, without determining whether or not such
supplement would result in substantial injury to defendants.
On appeal by plaintiff, reversed and remanded under § 10-409,
"At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems
just the court may allow any process or proof of service to
be amended, unless it clearly appears that material prejudice
would result to the substantial rights of the party against
whom such process issued."
The above is a case of first impression in construing
§ 10-409, wherein the word "may" is held to mean "must,"
so that, in the circumstances called for the trial court must ex-
ercise discretion in allowing or disallowing amendment to
process, considering whether or not "material prejudice would
result to the substantial rights" of the adversary in making
such order.
Actions and Parties
Babb v. Paul Revere Life Insurance Company,2 involved com-
plaint by named beneficiary of "non-cancellable" income policy
issued to insured, now deceased, where, during lifetime of in-
sured, and while he was allegedly insane, defendants induced
him, in consideration of payment to him of $638, to surrender
*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 224 S.C. 198,78 S.E. 2d 186 (1953).
2. 224 S.C. 1, 77 S.E. 2d 267 (1953).
127
1
Stubbs: Pleading
Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
policy, upon allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations that the
insurance contract was void. The complaint was framed in two
causes; (1) in equity for reinstatement, and (2) in tort for
fraud and conspiracy. The trial court, on motion, required
election and plaintiff elected to proceed in tort. A demurrer
for no cause of action was filed by defendant, in that, upon
death of insured no right of action survived, and, therefore,
that no right of action remained in the beneficiary. The de-
murrer was overruled and this order, on appeal, was sustained.
The beneficiary had only an inchoate interest in the policy
during lifetime of insured, where the right to change the
beneficiary had been reserved, but this ripened into a vested
interest upon the death of the insured without change of
beneficiary, and the latter could thereafter maintain an action
in tort for wrongful cancellation, despite the fact that the right
of the insured to bring such action expired with his death.
Dissent by Oxner, J., on ground that "when policy ceased
to be of force and effect [admitted by respondent] plaintiff's
rights therein ceased. Result [of majority view] is that a
cause.., which accrued to insured during life-time but which
did not survive can now be brought by plaintiff [beneficiary]
individually, who admittedly had no right in such cause of
action at the time it arose." § 10-642 (6) was not cited, nor
is there any mention in either dissenting or majority view as
to tender of the $638 by the plaintiff as a prerequisite to
bringing suit at law.
In Collopy v. Citizens Bank of Darlingtons the Court had
for consideration the proper construction of a complaint for
damages alleging that defendant bank, in which plaintiff's
funds were deposited in a trade name, had (though notified
of plaintiff's ownership) paid the same over to one Hall,
plaintiff's agent, who had absconded. The complaint alleged
negligence, wilfulness and wantonness on part of defendant,
and sought punitive damages-all appropriate to a tort action.
The defendant moved to strike such allegations and prayer as
being inappropriate to an action for breach of contract. The
trial court denied the motion and, on appeal by defendant, was
reversed. Wilful violation of contract does not entail upon
defaulting obligor liability for punitive damages. Doubt as
to construction of complaint as for breach of contract or in tort
should be resolved in favor of former. Words of recrimination
3. 223 S.C. 493, 77 S.E. 2d 215 (1953).
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will not convert contract action into one in tort. The proper
construction of complaint here is that wilful acts of defendant
were violations of obligations growing out of deposit contract.
This was not an action for fraudulent breach of contract, as
no fraudulent collusion was alleged, nor that defendant profit-
ed by transaction. In actions for mere breach of contract mo-
tives of wrongdoer are immaterial in considering amount of
damages, which are those naturally and proximately result-
ing from the wrongful act. (§ 10-606 is applicable but is not
cited by the Court.)
Defense
In Bailey v. Seymore4 the Court had for consideration a
complaint for personal injuries to a minor who was alleged to
have been "prevailed upon" (by defendant's truck-driver) to
go on a trip with him from South Carolina to Georgia, during
which the injuries allegedly occurred. Defendant moved to
have the complaint made more definite and certain (obviously
under § 10-606, although it is not cited), so as to show whether
plaintiff was a non-paying guest or not, within the terms of
the South Carolina "guest statute" under which there is no
liability for injuries to a non-paying guest, "unless such acci-
dent shall have been intentional on the part of such ... oper-
ator.., or caused by his heedlessness, etc." The refusal of the
trial court to grant such motion was held on appeal to be re-
versible error.
Bowen v. Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers Internat'l. Union
of America,5 as to procedure might well be compared with the
Bailey case, supra. Here there was an action for damages
brought by a worker against a labor union and its officers,
based upon an alleged conspiracy by defendants which caused
the ousting and discharge of plaintiff from lucrative employ-
ment. Defendants demurred (obviously under § 10-642 (1),
although it is not cited) in that the court was without juris-
diction, which was vested exclusively in the National Labor
Relations Board under the Taft-Hartley Act. The overruling
of demurrer by the trial court was sustained on appeal,
with leave to defendants to amend their answer by asserting
therein the bases of their contentions which they attempted
to do by demurrer. The complaint here failed to make clear
whether or not the wrong complained of was actionable within
4. 224 S.C. 162, 77 S.E. 2d 803 (1953).
5. 80 S.E. 2d 343 (S.C. 1954).
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the jurisdiction of the state court or exclusively within that
of the National Labor Relations Board. The result of the
case seems entirely sound. The question here involved might
more readily have been raised by defendants' timely motion
to make more definite and certain.
In considering the use of demurrers to test the sufficiency
of a cause of action or defense, the case of Bryant v. Bryant6
should logically be dealt with next. There plaintiff filed a
complaint for divorce to which defendant asserted two de-
fenses. Plaintiff thereupon demurred to only paragraphs 4,
5 and 6 of defendant's "first defense," which asserted in sub-
stance that the marriage in question was void and illegal. The
trial court overruled the demurrer and this was sustained on
appeal, under 1942 Code, § 471 (now § 10-661): ". . . the
plaintiff may in all cases demur to an answer containing new
matter, where, upon its face, it does not constitute a counter-
claim or defense." Under this provision a demurrer may not
be addressed to only a portion of a sole defense. A demurrer
may be addressed only to a whole complaint or to the whole
of one of its causes.7 The same is true of a demurrer to an
answer.
Smitk v. Traxler was an action for damages by lessee of
premises with an option to buy against lessor. Defendant de-
murred on the ground of no cause of action (§ 10-642 (6),
not cited) in that the complaint failed to show compliance with
the Statute of Frauds, and the trial court overruled the same.
Later, after some excusable delay, defendant offered an
amendment, in effect pleading the Statute of Frauds. The trial
court disallowed the amendment on the ground that the ruling
on the demurrer-viz., that an action for fraud was stated
and that the Statute of Frauds is no defense to an action for
fraud, had, until reversed, become the law of the case. This
ruling was assigned as error and, on appeal, was reversed.
The appellate court viewed the complaint as stating more than
one cause of action, although not separately stated, and that
the ruling of the trial court on demurrer was limited to the
sole question of whether or not the Statute of Frauds is appli-
cable to a cause of action for damages for fraud. It was not
binding as to the other causes of action, said the court, and,
indeed, although fraud might be alleged there might be a
6. 223 S.C. 489, 76 S.E. 2d 927 (1953).
7. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-642.
8. 224 S.C. 290, 78 S.E. 2d 630 (1953).
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failure of proof of the same, in which event a plea of the
Statute of Frauds might well be appropriate. Amendments
are favored where the adversary is not surprised thereby, and
while "amendments by the Court", under § 10-692, are ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, the ruling
in question was not, based upon this exercise of discretion,
but was rested solely upon a legal ground which proved to be
erroneous.
Tials and Hecrings
In Truesdale v. Jones,9 the complaint sought to have the
annexation of additional territory by a town declared void
for failure to comply with applicable statutes. The complaint
alleged, "A petition was submitted to the [town] council by
a majority of the freeholders of the territory it was proposed
to annex." On the trial of the case complainant sought to in-
troduce evidence to show that such was not true, that is,
in derogation of his own allegations. Upon objections to such
evidence by defendants the same was disallowed by the trial
court. On appeal by complainant the rejection of such evi-
dence was sustained, the reviewing court very properly hold-
ing that the pleader was judicially bound by his own admis-
sions.
Town of Myrtle Beachk v. Suber,10 like the Truesdale case,
supra, is one involving the principle that a party once taking
"'a stand" is disallowed from reversing himself. Here there
was an action by the town against a former member of its
Board of Commissioners of Public Works for an accounting for
the value of certain lumber from four large cypress water
tanks which he had used and for delivery of the unused por-
tion of said lumber. The tanks in question were transferred
by the United States to the town on condition that they were
not to be resold without written approval of the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority. The town in turn transferred to the Board
of Commissioners the management of its water works sys-
tem, of which the court found these tanks to have become a
part. The tanks being for a long time unused and suffering
deterioration, the members of the Board, in turn, transferred
them to defendant (one of their number) as an individual, for
a total consideration of $265, but without the consent of the
9. 224 S.C. 237, 78 S.E. 2d 274 (1953).
10. 81 S.E. 2d 352 (S.C. 1954).
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Civil Aeronautics Authority. By act of March 12, 1952, the
Board of Commissioners of Public Works was abolished and
its duties and functions were revested in the Mayor and Coun-
cil of the town. Shortly thereafter the town commenced this
action. Upon plaintiff's motion the Court ordered a reference
in which the plaintiff-the town-participated. But the re-
sults of the reference were findings unfavorable to plaintiff,
and these were affirmed by the circuit judge. The plaintiff
now complains, on appeal, that the circuit judge erred in
granting a reference, hearings upon which were held without
the prior determination of the plaintiff's right to an account-
ing. In sustaining the decree below the reviewing court point-
ed out that the right to an accounting was determined upon
a preliminary ruling of the circuit judge to the effect that
the complaint stated a cause of action for accounting. More-
over appellant participated without objection or reservation
in the reference or general accounting. Here it appears that
appellant invoked and participated in that very procedure of
which it now complains.
Patrick v. Wolowek n involved a nuisance action for unliqui-
dated damages begun August 14, 1951, in which, on December
11, 1951, the trial judge entered a default judgment for $1,000,
without aid of a jury. Under this judgment the sheriff sold
plaintiff's home to the highest bidder for $5,700, making a
deed thereto to the purchaser. Out of the funds so received
respondent's judgment was satisfied, an outstanding mortgage
on the property was paid off, and the balance was tendered to
plaintiffs (appellants) who refused to accept same. On Jan-
uary 24, 1953, plaintiffs commenced this action to set aside
default judgment of December 11, 1951; to have execution
issued thereon quashed; the sale thereunder set aside; and the
deed to the purchaser cancelled. The plaintiffs, urging mental
incapacity as reason for their failure to answer, and contend-
ing principally that § 586 of the 1942 Code 12 was applicable
as of December 11, 1951, under which the trial judge acted
in entering default judgment, did not permit such judgment
to be entered in tort action for unliquidated damages, without
aid of a jury. Plaintiff's motion was disallowed by trial judge,
and, on appeal, this was reversed. The reviewing court held
that § 586, of the 1942 Code was applicable; that under it no
11. 81 S.E. 2d 717 (S.C. 1954).
12. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 10-1531 and 10-1532, as
amended in 1953; 48 STAT. 137.
[Vol. 7
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default judgment in a tort action for unliquidated damages
could properly be entered without employment of a jury; that
therefore, the judgment of December 11, 1951, was void and
should be set aside; and that §§ 10-1531 and 10-1532 as amend-
ed in 1953 are inapplicable.
Peters v. Double Cola Bottling Co.13 involved an action for
personal injuries against both manufacturer and retailer of a
bottled beverage, allegedly containing worms and other dele-
terious substances, which, when consumed by complainant,
caused illness, etc. The manufacturer was a corporation of
Richland County, while the retailer, its codefendant (nephew
of complainant) resided in Dorchester County, where the ac-
tion was brought. The corporate defendant moved for .
change of venue under § 10-303, viz.: ". . . If there be more
than one defendant then the action may be tried in any county
in which one or more of the defendants resides at the time
of the commencement of the action . . .", contending that the
retailer was not named defendant in good faith, but merely
to fix the venue in Dorchester County. The trial court over-
ruled this motion and, on appeal, this was affirmed. The re-
viewing court reasoned that whether the naming of a re-
tailer was in good or bad faith was a question to be deter-
mined by the trial judge, and, upon a review of the record,
it was unwilling to say that such finding was not supported
thereby. The appellate court also held that it was proper for
the trial court to take judicial notice of the applicable "pure
food" statutes, even though not pleaded, since complaint stated
a cause of action thereunder as well as at common law.
Appeal and Error
In Honeywell v. Dominick, et al.14 a bill was filed in two
causes: (1) for declaratory judgment as to validity of convey-
ance by executors-trustees of a plantation (a part of the
estate) to one of their number individually, and (2) for spe-
cific performance of contract of sale of same by latter trans-
feree to one Janney, who alone appealed from decree of court
ordering him to comply with his contract to purchase, although
all remaindermen and beneficiaries were named as defendants
thereto. The decree below was affirmed. Even though the
declaratory judgment statutes were improperly invoked here
13. 224 S.C. 437, 79 S.E. 2d 710 (1954).
14. 223 S.C. 365, 76 S.E. 2d 59 (1953).
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(a matter which the reviewing Court found it unnecessary to
consider), still the case proceeded and was tried on the cause
of specific performance, which was clearly within the plenary
jurisdiction of equity, where all necessary and proper parties
were named and represented.
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